ISSUE FOCUS

The Iraqi Special Tribunal under International Humanitarian Law

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The creation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in December 2003 by Iraqi authorities who were at the time under the legal occupation of the Coalition Provisional Authority marked the emergence of a new form of internationalized domestic tribunals. The Iraqis succeeded in incorporating the full range of modern crimes into their domestic codes alongside some carefully selected domestic offenses, while amending domestic procedural law in some key ways to align the process with established international law related to the provision of full and fair trials. The subsequent investigations and the beginning of trial proceedings generated major debates about the legitimacy of such a domestic forum within the context of human rights norms and the law of occupation. In particular, there was a major strand of thought from outside Iraq that the most legitimate and appropriate forum would have been an international process under the authority of the United Nations. This article examines the arguments made by the Iraqis who demanded a domestic process based on their inquisitorial model, setting them in the broader context of the emerging trends in international criminal law. Through a detailed and unique analysis of the provisions of human rights law and underlying Iraqi procedural law, it criticizes the arguments made by some that assume the illegitimacy of the tribunal under established international norms. The article provides the most detailed explanation of the law of occupation as it emerged following World War II to conclude that the establishment of the Tribunal as an independent court, and its subsequent validation by sovereign Iraqi domestic authorities, was completely valid and proper. The overarching theme of the article is that the imposition of artificial standards and the complete revocation of the preexisting Iraqi judicial structures would have created a process deemed wholly illegitimate by the Iraqi people and judiciary that would have undermined the establishment of the rule of law in Iraq. The author’s personal interactions with the

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judges serve to support the conclusion that the Tribunal is capable of serving as the doorway through which the detailed body of international criminal law is introduced to the broader Arabic speaking world.

Key words
complementarity, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, international humanitarian law.

I. Introduction

The people of Iraq have a legal and moral right to build a structure for the prosecution of the leading figures in the Ba’athist regime. More to the point, the judges who have risked their lives to build the rule of law in Iraq should rightfully expect the support and encouragement of the world rather than a cautious and lukewarm assurance that the civilized peoples of the world wish them the best. I was involved in the conceptual development and drafting of the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), and have subsequently spent many hours with the judges and investigators of the court as they prepare to undertake their important work. I have gained a deep respect for the legal ethos and professional courage of the members of the Iraqi bar who have risked their lives and those of their families to serve the Iraqi people. My experience has convinced me that the creation of the IST is not only warranted under the existing structure of international law, but accords with the highest aspirations of those who purport to believe in the rule of law.

The creation of the IST was borne of necessity after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The exercise of punitive criminal accountability pursuant to domestic laws is at the heart of our understanding of what it means to have a society built on the rule of law, which in turn makes it the sine qua non of true sovereignty. This principle is so essential that the pursuit of justice often becomes a focal point for the military forces deployed to a society where the legislative and judicial systems have become corrupted, replaced, or have simply collapsed under the weight of tyranny.\(^1\) Assuming its proper role on behalf of the Iraqi people, the Interim Iraqi Governing Council made the creation of an accountability mechanism for punishing those responsible for the atrocities of the

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Ba’athist regime one of its earliest priorities. After an extensive and genuine partnership that entailed months of debate, drafting, and consideration of expert advice solicited from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Iraqi Governing Council issued the IST Statute on December 10, 2003. The announcement of the Statute culminated a developmental process carried out under the auspices of the Legal Affairs subcommittee of the Iraqi Governing Council led by Judge Dara, and by sheer coincidence preceded the capture of Saddam Hussein by only four days.

Ancillary to the announcement of the Statute, the Iraqi Governing Council and CPA requested that the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) present a seminar on investigating and prosecuting international crimes in accordance with international norms. The diverse group of 96 Iraqi judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who gathered in Baghdad were among the first Iraqis outside the Governing Council to review the Statute. Members of this group repeatedly and enthusiastically referred to Saddam’s regime as the “entombed regime.” The members of the Iraqi legal community that we were teaching later formed the pool of Iraqis who were initially considered for various positions inside the Iraqi Special Tribunal. I was in the room with those Iraqi judges and prosecutors in Baghdad when they learned of the successful capture of President Hussein. In the frenzy of joy and palpable relief that followed the electric news, one of the judges hugged me and exclaimed “Today is day one!” His spontaneous vision captured the sense of many Iraqis that the definitive end of the Hussein regime was a watershed event for those dedicated to leading Iraq towards stability and sovereignty founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law. In addition, judges have reiterated to me on a number of occasions that they view their

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2 Interview with David Hodgkinson, Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad (Dec. 11, 2003).
4 See Defense Institute of International Legal Studies Mission, available at http://www.dsca.mil/diils/ (last revised on May 5, 2005). The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides education teams to address over 330 legal topics, with a focus on Justice Systems, the Rule of Law, and the execution of disciplined military operations. Since its inception in 1992, DIILS officers have presented programs tailored to the needs of the host country to over 23,000 senior military and civilian government officials in 95 nations around the world. Seminars are designed for audiences of 40 to 60 military and civilian executive personnel from the host country, and take place both in the host nation and in the United States.
5 The members of the joint team of military lawyers knew of the apprehension just prior to the receipt of the news by the judges. A cell phone rang, and one of the judges sprang to his feet and interrupted the ongoing class. He shouted the news, and the entire class disintegrated for the day. The celebratory fire of AK-47s punctuated the Iraqi afternoon and lasted most of the night. The classroom celebration was long and joyous as normally reserved older gentlemen danced and hugged and cried with relief at the news. For a description of the broader mood of the Iraqi people, see Anne Barnard & Michael Kranish, Baghdad Falls: Euphoric Iraqis Topple Symbols; US Warns That War Not Over, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2003, at A1.
important work as the doorway that will expand the influence and application of international humanitarian law across the Arab-speaking areas of the world.

The dedication of the Iraqi legal professionals to restore the rule of law reflects the broader societal thirst for accountability that is a foreseeable feature of a post-conflict civil society emerging from widespread and official governmental human rights abuses. As a microcosm of Iraqi society, the overwhelming majority of that original group of 96 legal professionals had suffered the loss of immediate family members to the criminal acts of the regime. One judge was the only survivor of seven brothers. The elation of the Iraqi people mirrored that of other societies where the civilian population prized justice and an end to repression in the immediate aftermath of operations even in areas where the citizens suffer from extreme poverty and overwhelming material needs. The demise of the regime fanned the long-subdued embers of hope that the citizenry had never quite forgotten; people began to openly discuss the dim but potent aspiration that they might be able to live in peace and stability secure in the knowledge that the rule of law would protect their home and family. The priority that the common people attach to the restoration of true justice perhaps reflected an inchoate realization that the freedom from oppression achieved by coalition forces could not be sustained without effective restoration of personal accountability based on law. The elation that Iraqi citizens expressed as the statues of Saddam Hussein fell in Baghdad testified to their deep desire for the restoration of a society built on the rule of law rather than one dominated by the whims of a dictator supported by the machinery of bureaucratic oppression.

The IST was created with the express goal of bringing personal accountability to

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6 Non-governmental organizations and the U.S. Department of State have catalogued a panoply of human rights abuses under Saddam’s rule in Iraq, inter alia, the deaths of 50,000 to 100,000, Kurds; the destruction of 2,000 Kurdish villages; the internal displacement of 900,000 Iraqi civilians; summary executions of over 10,000 political opponents; beheadings; prostitution; and the intentional deprivation of food to the civilian population. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, LIFE UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN: PAST REPRESSSION AND ATROCITIES BY SADDAM HUSSEIN’S REGIME, (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/fs/19352.htm (last visited on June 4, 2005).

7 See e.g., Georges Anglade, Rules, Risks, and Riffs in the Transition to Democracy in Haiti, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1176, 1190 (1997) (“In the presence of an inhuman spectacle of misery and its urgent material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of people are liberty, justice, and security. Because a pauper also needs justice, the object of a transition to democracy becomes the modern organization of justice in a State of law. This demands destruction of the old military-police apparatus in order to give birth to another organization in charge of public order. It also requires that the institutions of justice and the body of functionaries that make them work be reconsidered so as to produce a ‘just justice’ and in order to guarantee a ‘free freedom.’ Haiti must reconstruct judicial power separate from the executive power, which too often has controlled judicial power. Justice by law is thus the initial goal in the transition to democracy as well as the object of the transition itself. It is essentially through the achievement of this goal that Haiti can unite a country broken in two, and create a single people from two profoundly antagonistic factions. Economic analysis also poses justice as a preliminary condition necessary to development.”).
those Ba’athists that were responsible for depriving Iraqis of their human rights, and of virtually extinguishing the real rule of law for over two decades. It would be ironic indeed if the mechanism created by the Iraqis to address the human rights failings of the past in itself became the vehicle for denying and suppressing human rights into the future. The purpose of this paper is to assess the creation and implementation of the IST in light of relevant human rights norms. From my perspective, the men and women who have committed themselves to serve the IST are the ones who have shouldered the burden of replacing the osmosis of fear that pervaded Iraq under Saddam’s rule with the peace and societal stability that flows from a solid rule of law.

It is false to presume that the Tribunal will be capable of achieving only the shadow of justice through the vehicle of undermining the core human rights of those who will face charges under its authority. Such an assumption is unwarranted as demonstrated by a closer examination of the structure of the Statute and its accompanying Rules of Evidence and Procedure. In particular, the interface of the IST Statute with the preexisting structure of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure reveals a developed web of legal protections that fully accord with existing human rights principles. This paper will discuss the basis under international law that warranted the formation of the IST and describe the salient features of the Tribunal’s structure. After noting some of the most important points of comparison between the IST and earlier accountability mechanisms, the paper will conclude with a detailed explication of the relationship between the Tribunal and the most important of the existing human rights norms related to the process of criminal accountability for crimes derived from international law.

II. Legal Authorities for the Creation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal

A. The Law of Occupation

The relationship of a subjugated civilian population to the foreign power temporarily exercising de facto sovereignty is regulated by the extensive development of the law of occupation. As a matter of legal rights and duties, “[t]erritory is considered occupied


when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” 10 This legal test is met when the following circumstances prevail on the ground: first, that the existing governmental structures have been rendered incapable of exercising their normal authority; and second, that the occupying power is in a position to carry out the normal functions of government over the affected area.11 For the purposes of United States policy, occupation is the legal state occasioned by “invasion plus taking firm possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it.” 12

Although a state of occupation does not “affect the legal status of the territory in question,”13 the assumption of authority over the occupied territory implicitly means that the existing institutions of society have been swept aside. Because the foreign power has displaced the normal domestic offices, the cornerstone of the law of occupation is the broad obligation that the foreign power “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety...” (emphasis added).14

In the authoritative French, the occupier must preserve “l’ordre et la vie public” (i.e. “public order and life”).15 On that legal reasoning alone, the establishment of the IST could have been warranted under the inherent occupation authority of the Coalition as an integral part of the strategic plan for restoring public calm and peaceful stability to

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12 FM 27-10, supra note 10, ¶ 352.


15 Id. The conceptual limitations of foreign occupation also warranted a temporal limitation built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions that the general “application of the present Convention [law of occupation] shall cease one year after the general close of military operations...” Id. at art. 6. Based on pure pragmatism, Article 6 of the 4th Geneva Convention does permit the application of a broader range of specific treaty provisions “for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory...” Id. The 1977 Protocols eliminated the patchwork approach to treaty protections with the simple declarative that “the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of the Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation...” Protocol I, art. 3(b), U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), 1125 U.N.T.S 3.
the civilian population across Iraq. From that perspective, the IST is the intellectual twin to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) because the United Nations Security Council established the ICTY with a groundbreaking 1993 Resolution that was premised on the legal obligation of the Security Council to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”

The IST and ICTY are both founded on the assessment by the officials charged with preserving stability and the rule of law that prosecution of selected persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law will facilitate the restoration of societal peace and stability (“l’ordre et la vie publics” in the language of the Hague Regulations). After the first defendant, a Serb named Dusko Tadic, challenged the legality of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber ruled that the authority of the Security Council to create the tribunal was dispositive. Just as the Security Council has the “primary responsibility” for maintaining international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, the law of occupation imposed a concrete legal duty on the CPA to facilitate the return of stability and order to Iraq after the fall of the regime. As criminal forums conceived and created pursuant to the broader responsibility of empowered authorities to maintain or restore peace and security, both the ICTY and IST were appropriate non-military mechanisms (though each was creative in its own time and in different ways).

In the context of Iraq, of course, the legal framework of occupation rests on a delicate balance. On the one hand, the civilian population has no legal right to conduct activities that are harmful to persons or property of the occupying force, and may be convicted or interned based on such unlawful activities. Article 42 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War hereinafter referred to by

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17 U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (giving the Security Council the power to “determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and it “shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article... to maintain or restore international peace and security”).
18 See also infra note 114 and accompanying text for a similar conclusion in relation to the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the basis of an agreement between the Security Council and the government of Sierra Leone.
19 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Aug. 10, 1995, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm (last visited on Jan. 10, 2009) (“[T]his International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up to scrutinise the actions of organs of the United Nations. It is, on the contrary, a criminal tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those specific limits, it will have no authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the Security Council.”).
20 U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1).
21 Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
its more common appellation the Geneva Convention IV specifically permits the deprivation of liberty for civilians if “the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.” Even large-scale internment may be permissible in situations where there are “serious and legitimate reasons” to believe that the detained persons threaten the safety and security of the occupying power. At the same time, the coercive authority of the occupying power is limited by a specific prohibition against making any changes to the governmental structure or institutions that would undermine the benefits guaranteed to civilians under the Geneva Conventions. Thus, the baseline principle of occupation law is that the civilian population should continue to live their lives as normally as possible.

This baseline principle rests on the reality that mere occupation does not effect a transfer of sovereignty; hence, the occupying power must protect the lives and property of the civilian population from the uncertainties inherent in the transfer of political authority to the maximum practicable extent. This concept may be termed the minimalist principle, though some observers have termed it the principle of normality. As a policy priority flowing from the mandates of the Geneva Convention IV, domestic law should be enforced by domestic officials insofar as possible, and crimes not of a military nature that do not affect the occupant’s security will normally be delegated to the jurisdiction of local courts. The IST fits this legal/policy model precisely as it was created and subsequently ratified by Iraqi authorities as an Iraqi domestic statute.

However, the international legal regime does not doggedly elevate the provisions of domestic law and the structure of domestic institutions above the pursuit of justice. Despite the minimalist principle, international law allows reasonable latitude for an occupying power to modify, suspend, or replace the existing penal structure in the interests of ensuring justice and the restoration of the rule of law. In its temporary exercise of functional sovereignty over the occupied territory, and as a pragmatic necessity, the occupation authority must ensure the proper functioning, \textit{inter alia}, of domestic criminal processes and cannot abdicate that responsibility to domestic officials of the civilian population who may or may not be willing or able to carry out their normal functions in pursuit of public order.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 42, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
\item \textsuperscript{26} See Jean S. Pictet, \textit{Principles du Droit International Humanitaire}, CICR, Genève, at 50 (1966).
\item \textsuperscript{27} FM 27-10, supra note 10, ¶ 370.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 54, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“[T]he Occupying Power may not alter the status of public officials or judges, or in any way apply sanctions to or take measures of coercion or discrimination against them should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience.”).
\end{itemize}
normality, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations mandates that the occupying power must respect, “unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

The duty found in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to respect local laws unless “absolutely prevented” (in French “empêchement absolu”) imposes a seemingly categorical imperative. However, rather than being understood literally, empêchement absolu has been interpreted as the equivalent of “nécessité.” In the post World War II context, this meant that the Allies could set the feet of the defeated Axis powers “on a more wholesome path” rather than blindly enforcing the institutional and legal constraints that had been the main bulwarks of tyranny.

Article 64 of the Geneva Convention IV explained the implications of older Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations by explaining the exception to the minimalist principle in more concrete terms. In ascertaining the implications of the 1949 Article 64 language with regard to the 2003 occupation in Iraq, it is important to realize its drafters did not extend the “traditional scope of occupation legislation.” Hence, the law of the Geneva Convention amplified the concept of necessity understood at the time to be embedded in the old Hague Article 43. Article 64 incorporates the preexisting baseline of normality within the confines of protecting the legal rights of the civilian population. Article 64 accordingly reads as follows:

The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue

30 Id.
33 For example, German forces were able to commit almost unthinkable brutalities under the shield of Nazi sovereignty based on the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle) imposed by Hitler to exercise his will as supreme through the police, the courts, the military, and all the other institutions of organized German society. The oath of the Nazi party stated: “I owe inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates for me.” DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR’S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1037-38 (1999). Accordingly, power resided in Hitler, from whom subordinates derived absolute authority in hierarchical order. This absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in all areas of public and private life led, in Justice Jackson’s famous words, to “a National Socialist despotism equalled [sic] only by the dynasties of the ancient East.” Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, II TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99-100 (1947).
to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. The plain language of Article 64 must be interpreted in good faith in light of the object and purpose of the Fourth Convention, which seeks to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population and ameliorate the potentially adverse consequences of occupation subsequent to military defeat. The first paragraph balances both the minimalist intent of the framers with the overriding purpose of balancing the concurrent rights of both the civilian population and the right of the occupier to maintain the security of its forces and property. The second paragraph of Article 64 morphed the implicit meaning of “necessary” drawn from the old Hague Article 43 into an explicit authority to amend the domestic laws to achieve the core purposes of the Convention. Article 64 has thus been accepted and implemented by states in light of the common sense reading and the underlying legal duties of the occupier to permit modification of domestic law under limited circumstances.

B. Legal Authority for the Promulgation of the IST

The touchstone of analysis for the promulgation of the IST is to recognize that the CPA mission statement gave it affirmative authority as the “temporary governing body designated by the United Nations as the lawful government of Iraq until such time as Iraq is politically and socially stable enough to assume its sovereignty.” On one level,
the revalidation by Iraqi authorities of the IST after the return of full Iraqi sovereignty makes an analysis of IST formation under the umbrella authority of the CPA a moot point. At the same time, the IST as it exists today is cloaked in a seamless garment of legality both in terms of its origination and in its ongoing existence as a distinct branch of Iraqi bureaucracy. The CPA posited its power as the occupation authority in Iraq in declarative terms: “The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war.”

The appellation “Coalition Provisional Authority” was a literal title in every aspect: 1) It represented the members of the coalition ultimately composed of over twenty nations, 2) it was intended to be a temporary power to bridge the gap to a full restoration of Iraqi sovereign authority, and 3) (perhaps most importantly) it exercised the obligations incumbent on those states occupying Iraq in the legal sense, and conversely enjoyed the legal authority flowing from the laws and customs of war.

This understanding of CPA status comports with the diplomatic representations made at the time of its formation. The United Nations Security Council unanimously recognized “the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states (the members of the coalition) as occupying powers under unified command (the “Authority”). The CPA was therefore recognized as the entity legally responsible for implementing the obligations imposed by the law of occupation.

Security Council Resolution 1483 was passed unanimously on May 22, 2003, and called upon the members of the CPA to “comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.” Resolution 1483 is particularly noteworthy for the formation of the IST because the Security Council specifically highlighted the need for an accountability mechanism “for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime.” The Security Council further required the CPA to exercise its temporary power over Iraq in a manner “consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the

39 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf. (last visited on June 4, 2005). The CPA website is the only existing public record of actions taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
42 Id. at ¶ 5.
43 Id.
effective administration of the territory.” Though strikingly similar to the declaration of allied power in occupied Germany after World War II, CPA Regulation 1 was therefore founded on bedrock legal authority flowing from the competence of the Security Council based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter power as supplemented by the preexisting power granted to the occupier by the laws and customs of war. Resolution 1483 operated in conjunction with the residual laws and customs of war to establish positive legal authority for the formation of the IST by the CPA and Governing Council. The subtle linkage between Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 gave the CPA broad discretion to delegate the authority for promulgation of the IST to the Governing Council as a matter of necessity. At its core, Article 64 protects the rights of citizens in the occupied territory to a fair and effective system of justice. As a first step, and citing its obligation to ensure the “effective administration of justice,” the CPA issued an order suspending the imposition of capital punishment in the criminal courts of Iraq and prohibiting torture as well as cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in occupied Iraq. The declaration of a duty to ensure the “effective administration of justice” in CPA Order Number 7 was an inarguable derivative of the duty imposed by the Security Council Resolution 1483 to work towards the “effective administration of the territory” of Iraq. Exercising his power as the temporary occupation authority, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order Number 7, which suspended some aspects of domestic law and amended the Iraqi Criminal Code in other important ways seeking to suspend or modify laws that “the former regime used...as a tool of repression in violation of internationally recognized human rights.”

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44 Id. at ¶ 4.
45 General Eisenhower’s Proclamation said, “Supreme legislative, judicial, and executive authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government is established to exercise these powers . . . .” Reprinted in Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), MILITARY GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, Issue A, Page 1 (June 1, 1946) (copy on file with author).
46 The IVth Geneva Convention recognized the importance of individual rights enjoyed by the civilian population and the correlative duties of the occupier to that population. The structure of the IVth Convention rejected the concept of debellatio by focusing on the duties that an Occupying Power has towards the individual civilians and the overall societal structure rather than focusing on the relations between the victorious sovereign and the defeated government. Under the rejected concept of debellatio, the enemy was utterly defeated and accordingly the defeated state forfeited its legal personality and was absorbed into the sovereignty of the occupier. GREENSPAN, supra note 32, at 600-01. The successful negotiation of the Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of World War II marked the definitive rejection of the concept of debellatio, under which the occupier assumed full sovereignty over the civilians in the occupied territory. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 95 (1993). Debellatio “refers to a situation in which a party to a conflict has been totally defeated in war, its national institutions have disintegrated, and none of its allies continue militarily to challenge the enemy on its behalf.” Id. at 92.
48 Id.
Furthermore, the subsequent promulgation of CPA Policy Memorandum Number 3 on June 18, 2003 was based on the treaty obligation to eliminate obstacles to the application of the Geneva Conventions because it amended key provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Code in order to protect the rights of the civilians in Iraq.\(^{49}\) The IVth Geneva Convention prescribed a range of procedural due process rights for the civilian population in occupied territories that presaged the evolution of human rights norms following World War II.\(^{50}\) The implementation of these goals in Iraq accorded with the established body of occupation law and simultaneously fulfilled the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1483 pursuant to the duty of all states to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.”\(^{51}\) Though Policy Memorandum Number 3 effectively aligned Iraqi domestic procedure and law with the requirements of international law, it was at best a stopgap measure that was neither designed nor intended to bear the full weight of prosecuting the range of crimes committed by the regime. Indeed, Section 1 of the original June 18, 2003 Policy Memorandum Number 3 expressly focused on the “need to transition” to an effective administration of domestic justice weaned from a “dependency on military support.”\(^{52}\)

The second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Convention is the key to understanding the promulgation of the IST. Juxtaposed against the Article 64 authority to “subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligation under the present Convention,”\(^{53}\) Article 47 of the Fourth Convention makes clear that such “provisions” may include sweeping changes to the domestic legal and governmental structures. Article 47 implicitly concedes power to the occupying force to “change...the institutions or government” of the occupied territory, so long as those changes do not deprive the population of the benefits of the Civilians Convention.\(^{54}\) Of particular note to the IST process, Article 47 also prevented the CPA from effectuating changes that would undermine the rights enjoyed by the civilian population “by any agreement concluded

\(^{49}\) Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 3: Criminal Procedures was revised on June 27, 2004. It is available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html#Memoranda (last visited on Jan. 10, 2009).


\(^{51}\) U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.

\(^{52}\) Copy on file with author.

\(^{53}\) Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 64(2), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

\(^{54}\) Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. \textit{See also} FM 27-10, supra note 10, ¶ 365.
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power.”\textsuperscript{55} Thus, the CPA could not hide behind the fig leaf of domestic decision-making to simply stand by as domestic authorities in occupied Iraq created a process that would have undermined the human rights of those Iraqi citizens accused of even the most severe human rights abuses during the period of the “entombed regime.” United States Army doctrine reflects this understanding of the normative relationship with the reminder that “restrictions placed upon the authority of a belligerent government cannot be avoided by a system of using a puppet government, central or local, to carry out acts which would have been unlawful if performed directly by the occupant.”\textsuperscript{56}

The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention also makes clear that the occupying power may modify domestic institutions (which would include the judicial system and the laws applicable thereto) when the existing institutions or government of the occupied territory operate to deprive human beings of “the rights and safeguards provided for them” under the Fourth Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{57} These provisions of occupation law are consistent with the allied experiences during the post-World War II occupations, and were intended to permit future occupation forces to achieve the salutary effects inherent in rebuilding or restructuring domestic legal systems when the demands of justice require such reconstruction. Against that legal backdrop, direct CPA promulgation of the IST Statute and the accompanying reforms to the existing Iraqi court system could have been justified based on any of the three permissible purposes specified in Article 64 of the IV\textsuperscript{th} Geneva Convention (\textit{i.e.} fulfilling its treaty obligation to protect civilians, maintaining orderly government over a restless population demanding accountability for the crimes suffered under Saddam, or enhancing the security of coalition forces).

In other words, both Articles 47 and 64 provided a positive right to the CPA to impose a structure on the Iraqis for the prosecution of the gravest crimes of the Ba’athist regime. Given the state of occupation law, the reality of the matter is that the delegation of authority to the Governing Council to establish the IST meant that it was grounded in the soil of sovereignty rather than being susceptible to a portrayal of the Tribunal as a vehicle for foreign domination. If the CPA had the power to unilaterally create a structure for the prosecution of leading Ba’athists, the decision to delegate responsibility

\textsuperscript{55} Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

\textsuperscript{56} FM 27-10, supra note 10, ¶ 366 (further specifying that “Acts induced or compelled by the occupant are nonetheless its acts).

\textsuperscript{57} See IV Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 274 (O.M. UHLER & H. COURSIER eds. 1960) (explaining the intended implementation of the language of Article 47, Civilians Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287: “any change introduced” to domestic institutions by the occupying power must protect the rights of the civilian population).
for developing and promulgating the IST to the Iraqi officials follows as a logical
extension. Closer examination shows that the formation of the IST under the authority
of the Iraqi Governing Council actually mirrored the practice in World War II
occupations in which the British and Americans created guidelines to direct Germany
towards democracy, but ultimately gave the Germans great latitude in rebuilding their
country.58 At the same time, the affirmative obligations of Article 47 required a CPA role
to ensure that the judicial structure that emerged as a function of Iraqi domestic politics
and was promulgated as a domestic statute fully complied with relevant human rights
obligations59 as well as the specific treaty obligations that inhere to the people of Iraq as
“protected persons” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The development
of the IST Statute was an authentic partnership between Iraqi officials and coalition
officials who had the legal duty to protect the rights of all Iraqis. Nevertheless, the
process of developing the statute was opaque to the outside world, which at the time
allowed some observers to criticize the IST because of the perception (and assumption)
that it would function in fact as a “puppet court of the occupying power.”60 Lawyers

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58 See Walter M. Hudson, The U.S. Military Government and the Establishment of Democratic Reform, Federalism,

59 A full discussion of the extent to which human rights law applies in an occupation environment is beyond the scope
of this paper. There is a growing awareness that some aspects of human rights may apply extraterritorially alongside
the conventional obligations found in occupation law. The precise interrelationship between occupation law and
human rights norms is debatable and ill-defined at present. See e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Bankovic a.o.
(rejected on jurisdictional grounds) (declaring on dicta on the one hand that the European Convention may impose
obligations on states parties anywhere they exercise “effective control” while in another paragraph, para. 80, limiting
that gratuitous language to territory that “for the specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the
Convention” which means those state parties signatory). Contra European Court of Human Rights, Issa a.o.
v. Turkey, 30 May 2000, Application No. 31821/96. Obliquely referring to the connection between the two distinct
bodies of law, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in dicta that While the extraterritorial
application of the American Declaration has not been placed at issue by the parties, the Commission finds it
pertinent to note that, under certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extraterritorial
locus will not only be consistent with but required by the norms which pertain. The fundamental rights of the
individual are proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination – “without
distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex.” Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s
humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction.
While this most commonly refers to persons within a state’s territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to
conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject
to the control of another state – usually through the acts of the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry
turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether,
under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control. Coard
(last visited on June 26, 2005).

60 Michael P. Scharf, Is It International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals of
International Justice, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 330, 331 (2004) (the gravamen of the criticism was focused on the
truismos that the IST statute had been drafted during the occupation by the United States, its funding was coming
hired by Saddam Hussein’s wife rapidly played the legitimacy card by claiming that the IST could not impose any punishments lawfully because it lacked legitimacy, or lawful creation.61

Despite these early and unfounded criticisms, the delegation of authority to the Governing Council to develop and implement the IST did serve to increase the legitimacy of the institution and enhance the long range utility of the IST as a vehicle for restoring respect for the rule of law to the citizenry of Iraq. The people of Iraq demanded justice, and the eventual imposition of individual criminal responsibility on regime elites is likely to be far more beneficial to the ultimate restoration of respect for the rule of law when its genesis and execution are the responsibility of Iraqi officials whose interests are directly linked to the long term welfare of the Iraqi people.

III. The Structure of the Iraqi Special Tribunal

A. Organs of the Tribunal

The Iraqi jurists who gathered in Baghdad in December 2003 were anxious to learn about the best practices for ensuring a neutral and effective judicial system free to function beyond the reach of political control. The Statute echoes this concern by mandating in its very first provision that the IST “shall be an independent entity and not associated with any Iraqi government departments.”62 Because the Iraqi domestic system is built on a civil law model, the IST is the most modern effort to meld common and civil law principles into a consolidated system that comports with accepted standards of justice. The Tribunal is structured similarly to the existing ad hoc international tribunals in that it contains one or more Trial Chambers,63 and an Appeals

from the United States, its judges were selected by the U.S.-appointed provisional government, and the judges and prosecutors were to be assisted by U.S. advisors).


Chamber\textsuperscript{64} that is chaired by the President of the Tribunal who is responsible for exercising oversight of the “administrative and financial aspects of the Tribunal.”\textsuperscript{65}

Additionally, the Tribunal contains a Prosecutions Department of up to twenty prosecutors.\textsuperscript{66} Reflecting the concern of Iraqi jurists who watched the Ba’athist machinery corrode the rule of law, the Statute makes clear that “[e]ach Prosecutor shall act independently. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Governmental Department or from any other source, including the Governing Council or the Successor Government.”\textsuperscript{67}

Lastly, up to twenty Tribunal Investigative Judges will be responsible for gathering evidence of crimes within the jurisdiction of the IST “from whatever source” considered “suitable.”\textsuperscript{68} As they investigate individuals for the commission of crimes proscribed under the Statute, the Investigative Judges will serve for a term of three years under terms and conditions as set out in the preexisting Iraqi Judicial Organization Law. As a critical aspect of their mandate, the Investigative Judges “shall act independently as a separate organ of the Tribunal” and “shall not seek or receive instructions from any Governmental Department, or from any other source, including the Governing Council or the Successor Government.”\textsuperscript{69}

**B. Jurisdictional Reach of the IST**

The principle that states are obligated to use domestic forums to punish violations of international law has roots that run back to the ideas of Hugo Grotius.\textsuperscript{70} The United States Constitution incorporated this idea as an expression of congressional power in Article 1, § 8.\textsuperscript{71} As early as 1842, American Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the idea that a nation’s sovereignty also entails “the strict and faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages which have obtained currency among civilized states, and which have for their object the mitigation of the miseries of war.”\textsuperscript{72} Though

\textsuperscript{64} The Appeals Chamber has “the power to review the decisions of the Trial Chambers.” \textit{Id.} at art. 3. The IST Appeals Chamber proceedings should be deemed sufficient to protect the basic human right to an appeal just as the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC appellate chambers have been accepted by states.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} at art. 4(c)(ii).

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Id.} at art. 8(c).

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Id.} at art. 8(b).

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at art. 7(c), (i).

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id} at art. 7(j).


\textsuperscript{71} Empowering the legislative branch to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” \textit{U.S. Const.} art. I, § 8.

\textsuperscript{72} JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 1 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1906).
internationalized judicial mechanisms have permanently altered the face of international law, the domestic courts are the forum for the first resort of sovereign states while international mechanisms provide a useful but not essential backdrop in circumstances where the domestic courts are unable or unwilling to enforce individual accountability for serious violations of international norms. The Iraqi Special Tribunal is built on the basic principle that sovereign states retain primary responsibility for adjudicating violations of crimes defined and promulgated under international law.

Grounded as it is in the right of a sovereign state to punish its nationals for violations of international norms, the temporal jurisdiction of the IST covers any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq charged with crimes listed in the Statute that were committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003 inclusive. In addition, its geographic jurisdiction extends to acts committed on the sovereign soil of the Republic of Iraq, as well as those committed in other nations, including crimes committed in connection with Iraq’s wars against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Kuwait.

Articles 11-13 of the IST Statute establish the competence of the Tribunal to prosecute genocide (Article 11), crimes against humanity (Article 12), and war crimes committed during both international and non-international armed conflicts (Article 13). These substantive provisions are perhaps the most significant aspects of the Statute because they accurately incorporate the most current norms under international humanitarian law into the fabric of Iraqi domestic law for the first time. In addition, Article 14 conveys jurisdiction over a core group of crimes defined in the Iraqi criminal code.


77 Id.

78 Id. at arts. 11-13.

79 Id. at art. 14.
was a genuine collaborative process in which the Governing Council spoke strongly on behalf of the citizens it represented.

The Iraqi lawyers involved in drafting the Statute educated the American lawyers about the contents of the Iraqi Criminal Code and demanded inclusion of a select list of domestic crimes because the proscribed acts were so corrosive to the rule of law inside Saddam’s Iraq.

Article 14 accordingly reads as follows: The Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the following crimes under Iraqi law:

a) For those outside the judiciary, the attempt to manipulate the judiciary or involvement in the functions of the judiciary, in violation, *inter alia*, of the Iraqi interim constitution of 1970, as amended; b) The wastage of national resources and the squandering of public assets and funds, pursuant to, *inter alia*, Article 2(g) of Law Number 7 of 1958, as amended; and c) The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, as amended.80

For armchair lawyers tempted to dismiss the Tribunal as a bald assertion of coalition power, Article 14 is a window into the soul of the Iraqi bar because it reveals the offenses deemed most egregious by peace-loving Iraqis seeking to rebuild an Iraq based on freedom. The officials who committed the acts included in Article 14 in essence waged war on the Iraqi people and society; the prosecution of those acts was seen *by the Iraqis* as a prerequisite for restoring the rule of law inside Iraq. From the Iraqi perspective, the crimes listed in Article 14 are of comparable severity to the grave violations of international norms found in Articles 11-13. Therefore, the Iraqis felt that prosecution of the domestic crimes described in Article 14 would be a necessary component of the broader IST objective of helping to heal the wounds inflicted on Iraqi society by the Ba’athists.

Furthermore, Article 14(a) is especially notable. Inclusion of the domestic offense of involvement in the functions of the judiciary implicitly signifies the urgent priority that the Iraqis attach to judicial independence. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law.”81 As a matter of historical record, the mechanics of establishing a judiciary free of political control was the very first question asked as the DIILS team began to teach the jurists assembled in Baghdad in December 200382 Ba’athist deprivation of trial rights and the subsequent imposition of punishment as an

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80 Id.
81 ICCPR, supra note 50, at 52.
82 Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
extension of Ba’athist political power unrelated to evidence had a traumatizing effect on Iraqi society. The search for truth based on evidence rather than raw power is the essence of a legitimate trial process. The perversion of legitimate judicial functions under the farce of politically motivated playacting was an especially galling aspect of Saddam’s rule for those trained jurists whose proper judicial functions were bypassed and undermined by the regime.

Given this history, the provision of fair trials in the IST will be an important aspect of its legitimacy and serve as an important contrast to the fraudulent processes under the regime. The right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is a basic right derived from both human rights norms83 and the law of occupation (as a subset of the laws and customs of war).84 While the Statute itself mandates the independent functioning of both the Investigative Judges and the Prosecution, there is no such correlative provision regarding the judges serving in either the Trial or Appeals Chambers. This gap led Human Rights Watch to recommend that the judges be required in writing to act independently and receive no instructions from any external source.85 Despite the picayune textual crease pointed out by Human Rights Watch, the very fact that the Iraqis demanded the inclusion of Article 14a strongly compels the conclusion that they will be keenly sensitive to any attempts to exert political control over the conduct of trials and fiercely resistant to external attempts to manipulate the IST.

The early experience of the IST also demonstrates that it is a robust institution that has to date been able to withstand pressures on its independent operation.86 Awareness

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86 For example, when campaigning prior to the national elections held on January 30, 2005, interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi repeatedly sought to gain votes by frequently assuring both domestic and international audiences that the trials of leading Ba’athists (including Saddam Hussein and Chemical Ali) would begin imminently. The IST has thus far resisted exogenous pressures to rush the investigation and prosecution of cases, and has stated that trials would begin when judges are fully trained, and the development of cases is completed by the investigating judges and prosecutors.
of Saddam’s successful efforts to undermine the real rule of law through the façade of justice also explains one unusual but little noticed linguistic quirk found in the English translation of the IST Name. The jurists who gathered in Baghdad in December 2003 expressed a great deal of outrage at the manner in which the Hussein regime imposed its will on the Iraqi people through the use of Special or “Revolutionary” courts conducted by untrained minions. As a group, they were pleased to see the inclusion of Article 14(a). Despite the fact that the Statute plainly covers the full range of crimes recognized under current international law (genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws and customs of war during both international and non-international armed conflicts), the Iraqi officials who drafted the Tribunal Statute were determined to demonstrate the contrast between the IST and the corrupt judicial farces ordered by the regime. As a deliberate amendment at the very last editing session, the authoritative Arabic text used a different term to make a clear distinction from the “Special” or “Revolutionary” courts run under Ba’athist authority, which resulted in a slightly off kilter English translation. Article 1 of the IST Statute accordingly states “[a] Tribunal is hereby established and shall be known as the “Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity.” This subtle, but powerful reminder shows the keen judicial awareness of the Iraqi lawyers responsible for the IST statute as well as their commitment to the long-term restoration of the rule of law within Iraq.

C. Procedural Rights for the Accused

The provisions governing the rights of the accused are among the most highly scrutinized and vital provisions of the IST Statute. The CPA Order that delegated authority to the Iraqi leaders to promulgate the Statute required that the IST meet “international standards of justice.” Under the terms of the Statute, the Trial Chambers must “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in

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89 The Iraqi lawyers selected this term rather than “perpetrator” that was used in the International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes. There was extensive debate during the drafting of the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court over the relative merits of the terms “perpetrator” or “accused.” Though some delegations were concerned that the term perpetrator would undermine the presumption of innocence, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) ultimately agreed to use the former in the Elements after including a comment in the introductory chapeau that “the term “perpetrator” is neutral as to guilt or innocence. See KNÜT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 9-16 (2002).
accordance with this Statute and the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”

To illustrate the transformation of justice in free Iraq, the Statute specifies that “[n]o officer, prosecutor, investigative judge, judge or other personnel of the Tribunal shall have been a member of the Ba’ath Party.”

In its core operative provision, the Statute incorporates a full range of trial rights that, in the aggregate, are fully compatible with applicable human rights norms. Echoing the fundamental guarantees of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights instruments, Article 20 of the Statute states:

a) All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal;

b) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Tribunal in accordance with the law;

c) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of the Statute and the rules of procedure made hereunder; and

d) In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to a fair hearing conducted impartially and to the following minimum guarantees:

i) to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge against him; ii) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing in confidence. The accused is entitled to have non-Iraqi legal representation, so long as the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi; iii) to be tried without undue delay; iv) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; v) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defenses and to present other evidence admissible under this Statute and Iraqi law; and vi) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt, and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence.

92 Id. at art. 33.
93 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
94 See generally supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Article 20 of the IST Statute provides the range of personal rights to breathe life into the esoteric obligation found in Article 20 of the 1970 Interim Constitution of Iraq, which provides that an accused is “innocent, unless proved guilty at a legal trial.” The constitution also proclaims in evocative terms that “the right of defence (sic) is sacred in all stages of investigation and trial in accordance with the provisions of the Law.” The parallelism between Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 20 of the IST Statute is pure coincidence, but illustrates a judicial integrity and awareness of individual rights that is ingrained in the Iraqi legal consciousness. During his first appearance before an IST investigative judge, Saddam Hussein challenged the legal authority of the IST and demanded to know “how can you charge me with anything without protecting my rights under the constitution.”

IV. The Human Rights Infrastructure of the IST

A. The Synthesis of Civil and Common Law in the IST

International tribunals and the more recent phenomenon of internationalized domestic tribunals require a complex intermingling of procedural approaches derived from both civil and common law. Modern accountability mechanisms permit a range of hearsay evidence that would never be admitted for trial purposes in common law courtrooms.
while often providing provisions for plea agreements designed to enhance the efficiency of adjudication in a manner seldom seen in civil law systems.\textsuperscript{100} Civil law systems driven by investigative judges provide for more expeditious trial proceedings which minimize discrimination between rich and poor perpetrators because the investigative judge is charged with collecting evidence to support all sides of the case (the defense team is therefore not required to spend its own resources in gathering exculpatory evidence).\textsuperscript{101} On the other hand, the adversarial system may be more suited to a full airing of the available evidence in court and may be best suited for the purpose of compiling an accurate and comprehensive record of the history associated with the crimes in question, which after all is one of the vital purposes of individual accountability mechanisms.\textsuperscript{102} Paraphrasing Justice Jackson’s assessment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, “no history” of the era of Iraq under Ba’athist rule will be “entitled to authority” if it ignores the factual and legal conclusions that will be presented in open court in the IST.\textsuperscript{103}

The procedures for the introduction of evidence are perhaps the most notable aspect of the commingling of common and civil law traditions. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg set the precedent for simplifying evidentiary requirements in favor of a full airing of available facts before a panel of judges. Justice Jackson noted “peculiar and technical rules of evidence developed under the common-law system of jury trials to prevent the jury from being influenced by improper evidence constitute a complex and artificial science,” and accordingly accepted that rules of evidence at Nuremberg should put the premium on the probative value of the evidence.\textsuperscript{104} Justice Jackson also commented on the reality that, while dispensing with rigid rules of evidence gave the International Military Tribunal “a large and somewhat unpredictable

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\begin{enumerate}
\item UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT 122, BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (June 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr122.html (last visited on Jan.10, 2009).
\item Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, quoted in 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 49 (1955), reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 432, 438 (1945) (Justice Jackson also wrote: “[w]e have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed people.”).
\item Id. at xi. Interestingly, as a matter of historical record, the teams of international prosecutors at Nuremberg did not develop the detailed Elements of Crimes that have become an accepted feature of every subsequent international process.
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discretion,” it also permitted both the prosecution and defense to select “evidence on the basis of what it was worth as proof rather than whether it complied with some technical requirement.”

Since 1945, rather than operating under restrictive rules of evidence, all of the tribunals applying international humanitarian law have permitted evidence so long as it is relevant and “necessary for the determination of the truth.” This standard (drawn from the International Criminal Court Statute) compares favorably to the IST Rule of Procedure that permits the Trial Chamber to admit “any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.” Rather than developing a straitjacket set of rules related to the introduction of evidence, the IST Trial Chamber has the broader mandate to “apply rules of evidence which will best favour (sic) a fair determination of the matter before it and [which] are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and general principles of law.” Of course, these evidentiary provisions operate against the backdrop of Iraqi procedural law that requires the prosecutor to produce a quantum of evidence sufficient to satisfy the court of the guilt of the defendant.

Regardless of the procedural forms adopted, international law is clear that no accused should face punishment unless convicted pursuant to a fair trial affording all of the essential guarantees embodied in widespread state practice. Common Article 3 (meaning that it is repeated as article 3 in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949) states this principle with particularity by requiring that only a “regularly constituted court” may pass judgment on an accused person. Interpreting this provision in light of state practice, the International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC concluded that a judicial forum is “regularly constituted if it has been established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country.” Accepting the (ICRC) benchmark of legitimacy, the IST meets the criteria derived from the law of

105 Id.
107 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 79. This provision is adjacent to the common sense caveat that the Trial Chamber should “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 203.
111 For a summary of state practice and its implementation in treaty norms and military manuals around the world, see JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 352-75 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study].
112 ICRC Study, supra note 110, at 355.
war better than any of the other tribunals established to adjudicate violations of humanitarian law because it is designed to apply the general principles of criminal law drawn from existing Iraqi criminal law rather than simply supplanting those norms with externally mandated principles. The IST Statute provides that the President of the Tribunal “shall be guided by the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law” in the drafting of the rules of procedure and evidence for the admission of evidence as well as the other features of trial. Furthermore, the Statute specifically lists the provisions of Iraqi law that contain the general principles of criminal law to be applied “in connection with the prosecution and trial of any accused person” (emphasis added).

The structure of the IST and its accompanying procedures are similarly valid when measured against applicable human rights principles. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) phrases the concept noted above as requiring that a tribunal be “established by law.” The United Nations Human Rights Commission adopted a functional test that the tribunal should “genuinely afford the accused the full guarantees” in its procedural protections. Litigating its first case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was forced to determine whether this human right is violated per se by the prosecution of an accused before a post hoc tribunal created after the commission of the crimes. Noting that the ICCPR drafters rejected language specifying that only “pre-established” forums would provide sufficient human rights protections, the ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded:

The important consideration in determining whether a tribunal has been “established by law” is not whether it was pre-established or established for a specific purpose or situation; what is important is that it be set up by a competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures, and should that it observes the requirements of procedural fairness. For the purposes of human rights law, the IST is “established by law” because it is established by the authorities empowered under both


114 Id. at art. 17(a).

115 ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 14(1).


international law and the authority of the United Nations Security Council and because it is explicitly designed to provide the full range of human rights to the accused. The IST Statute establishes a firm duty on the court to “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with this Statute and the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses” (emphasis added).119 Similarly, the Trial Chamber must “satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected”120 and publicly support its decisions with “a reasoned opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting opinions may be appended.”121 The Iraqi Judicial Law specifies that the judge shall be bound to “preserve the dignity of the judicature and to avoid any thing that arouses suspicion on his honesty.”122 An a priori conclusion that the IST judges will ignore their professional ethos by willfully undermining the rights of the accused would betray an unseemly smugness and paternalism on the part of the international community.

The fact of the matter is that the IST Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are far from unique in their civil law foundations. Each conflict environment and accountability mechanism has required a slightly different set of blended procedures. For example, in the domestic prosecutions in Argentina, the trials were conducted using special procedures necessitated by the volume of information and the number of victims in comparison to normal crimes.123 In the case of the IST, the civil law foundations of the Iraqi Criminal Code provided the baseline, which was then modified where appropriate to comply with relevant human rights norms and occupation law. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia124 and the Special Court in Sierra Leone,125 the punitive authority of the IST derives from the sovereign authority of

120 Id. at art. 21(c).
121 Id. at art. 23(b).
the Iraqi people rather than the derivative authority of the United Nations Security Council. The analytical start point for the IST is therefore found in the existing body of Iraqi laws and procedures, even though the eventual destination is on the same intellectual block as the other tribunals. Comparison of the ad hoc tribunals with the treaty based forums such as the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone reveals that these tribunals borrow the “best” elements of both adversarial and inquisitorial trials. Where there are lacunae that remain in the IST Rules and Procedures, they are automatically filled by resort to the underlying principles of Iraqi domestic law, even as the judges are charged to interpret the substantive international crimes by “resort to the relevant decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive authority. . . .”126

Finally, the set of principles and rules emplaced at the formation of the IST will likely not solidify as rigid sets of static constraints. If the IST Rules and Procedures prove inadequate to ensure full respect for the rights of the accused as required by the Statute, then the judges may amend the rules accordingly.127 The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has said that the frequent amendments to the tribunal rules are necessary because the judges are “pragmatic people” grappling with the balance between truth and justice.128 The ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure have thus been modified more than thirty times. In order to facilitate case management and improve the pace of trials, the ICTY judges have moved away from the common law moorings prevalent at formation of the ICTY and clearly evolved a more civil law centric set of rules and procedures.129 The conclusion is clear that the IST Rules and Statute are validly promulgated and legally sufficient to protect the fundamental rights of the accused, but may be amended if needed due to the emerging


127 Id. at art. 16 (“The President of the Tribunal shall draft rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters (including regulations with respect to the disqualification of judges or prosecutors), where the applicable law, including this Statute does not, or does not adequately provide for a specific situation. Such rules shall be adopted by a majority of the permanent judges of the Tribunal.”).

128 Interview by Ljubica Gojgic with Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Belgrade (Sept. 18, 2003), available at www.b92.net/intervju/eng/2003/meron.php (last visited on Jan. 10, 2009). At the time of this writing, there have been thirty-six sets of amendments to the ICTY Rules of Procedure. See http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc(last visited on June 19, 2005).

129 See KNOOPS, supra note 99, at 91-100 (listing a number of specific rules changes in the ICTY).
exigencies that may arise in the pragmatic application of the rules as they appear on paper.

**B. Cornerstone of the Procedural Protection for the Accused**

No legal issue related to the IST can be definitively determined by reference to a single source. Article 17(a) of the Statute sets out a hierarchy of sources that will guide the judges: 1) the Statute itself; 2) the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; and 3) the existing body of Iraqi Criminal Procedure and substantive laws. In addition, the IST Statute makes clear that the judges “may resort to the relevant decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive authority for their decisions.” The IST Statute is linked to the underlying provisions of Iraqi domestic law and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to form a tightly woven fabric of legal protections. Accordingly, any conclusions derived about the core principles and protections of the IST can be drawn only after ALL of the relevant sources are considered. In a sense, the IST is similar to the ICTY in that the judges will rely to some extent on analogy to the national laws of the territory where the conflict occurred or to what they perceive to be the practices of other states or tribunals in applying the sophisticated set of principles found in international humanitarian law. This is identical to the repeated methodology of the ICTY judges. The difference for the IST judges is that the Iraqi process is explicitly built on the preexisting foundation of domestic law familiar to the judges; hence, the IST Rules of Procedure and the Statute are often silent or incomplete on a given subject precisely because the issue is definitively addressed in the underlying domestic Code. This article will conclude by pointing out some of the most notable areas where a casual reading of the IST Statute alone would lead to shallow or incomplete conclusions about the extent of IST protection of the defendant’s human rights.

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130 IST Statute, art. 17(a), Dec. 10, 2003, art. 38, 43 I.L.M. 231, available at http://iraqist.org/en/about/statute.htm (last visited on June 4, 2005). “Subject to the provisions of this Statute and the rules made thereunder, the general principles of criminal law applicable in connection with the prosecution and trial of any accused person shall be those contained: (i) in Iraqi criminal law as at July 17, 1968 as embodied in The Baghdadi Criminal Code of 1919 for those offenses committed between July 17, 1968 and December 14, 1969; (ii) in Law Number 111 of 1969 the Iraqi Criminal Code, as it was as of December 15, 1969, without regard to any amendments made thereafter, for those offenses committed between December 15, 1969 and May 1, 2003; and (iii) and in Law Number 23 of 1971 (the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law).”

131 Id. at art. 17(b).

1. Provision of Counsel

Article 20 of the IST Statute provides for the fundamental right "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [the] defense and to communicate freely with counsel... in confidence." Such counsel may include non-Iraqi lawyers, so long as the "principal lawyer" is an Iraqi. The IST Statute further provides that the Tribunal will pay for the costs of counsel "in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it." The experience of the ICTY indicates that this will be a major expense associated with the IST, as the provision of gratis counsel consumed ten percent of the ICTY budget, to the tune of some $10-13 million per year.

The counsel retained by a suspect or accused is then required to "file his power of attorney with the Judge concerned at the earliest opportunity." The Judge, in turn, shall consider the counsel to be qualified "in accordance with the Iraqi law of lawyers" (emphasis added). This small phrase constitutes an important safeguard in the IST process because it means that the counsel who will practice in the IST chambers remain bound by the codes of practice and ethics governing their profession and are qualified in accordance with the rigorous standards found in Iraqi law. In light of the serious allegations of misconduct of counsel in other tribunals, the IST Rules provide that a judge or chamber may impose sanctions against counsel whose "conduct remains offensive or abusive, demeans the dignity of the Special Tribunal, [or] obstructs the proceedings."

Furthermore, the fact that the principal attorney remains bound by the Iraqi code of professional conduct gives some force to the underlying right of the court to "prevent the parties and their representatives from speaking at undue length or speaking outside the subject of the case, repeating statements, violating guidelines or making accusations against another party or a person outside the case who is unable to put forward a defense [sic]."

Apart from providing for the appointment of counsel, the IST gives counsel a robust and visible role. The IST Rules stipulate that the investigating judge must notify all

134 Id. at art. 18(c).
135 Id.
137 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 48(A).
138 Id.
139 Id. at Rule 48(C).
140 For example, repeated abuses by counsel were responsible for the ICTY shift from paying hourly defense fees to a flat fee system. Special Report No. 122, supra note 101, at 7.
141 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 50.
142 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 154.
suspects of the following rights “in a language he speaks and understands” during their first appearance for questioning:

a. The right to legal assistance of his own choosing, including the right to have legal assistance provided by the Defense Office if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
b. The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language to be used for questioning; and
c. The right to remain silent. In this regard, the suspect or accused shall be cautioned that any statement he makes may be recorded and may be used in evidence.143

In accordance with Iraqi procedural law, any statement of the accused to the investigating judge is recorded in written form and “signed by the accused and the magistrate or investigator.”144 Thus, every suspect (to include Saddam Hussein) who has appeared before the IST investigative judges to date has been notified of their rights to counsel and has acknowledged their comprehension of those rights in writing. Those who assume that the IST will ignore and subvert the rights of defendants in the future must also assume that the investigative judges will abandon this established practice, but in doing so they would depart from a foundational aspect of criminal practice in Iraq which by an measure meets human rights standards.

Of course, as would be expected, an accused may voluntarily waive his right to have legal assistance during questioning, but only if the Investigative Judge determines that the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made.145 The Investigative Judge “shall not proceed without the presence of counsel” when questioning a suspect who has invoked the right to assistance.146 Furthermore, if a suspect has waived his right to counsel but then invokes that right, “the questioning should be stopped and never resume again until the defence [sic] be present.”147 These provisions comport fully with the relevant human rights provisions and are in complete accordance with the practices of other international tribunals.148

143 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 46(A).
144 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 128.
145 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 46(B).
146 Id. at Rule 46(C).
147 Id.
148 See e.g., Rule 63 of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited on June 19, 2005), reads as follows:

Questioning of Accused

(A) Questioning by the Prosecutor of an accused, including after the initial appearance, shall not proceed without the presence of counsel unless the accused has voluntarily and expressly agreed to proceed without counsel present.

If the accused subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, questioning shall thereupon cease, and shall only
2. Conduct of the Defense
The primary gap on the face of the IST Statute is that it is silent on the actual provisions for the defense of an accused. Of course, Article 20 protects the right to present a full defense, but the Statute itself does not reveal the manner in which those protections can be achieved. Rule 49 of the IST Rules of Evidence and Procedure outlines the functions of the Defense Office as a separate organ inside the IST, beginning with the requirement that the IST Director “shall establish a Defense Office for the purpose of ensuring the rights of accused.” From that premise, the defense team operates against the mesh of practice built into the IST framework.

The entire Iraqi criminal justice system is grounded on the role of the investigative judge as an impartial authority whose mandate is to objectively search for all available evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory. Indeed, under Iraqi law, investigating officers “are required to use all available means to preserve evidence of an offense,” and must prepare the written report collating the evidence for the subsequent use of trial judges in the event that charges are documented to warrant a trial. The IST Rules build on this practice by requiring the prosecutor to provide all exculpatory evidence to the defense, as well as any evidence which “may be relevant to issues raised in the Defense Case Statement.” Under the normal principles of Iraqi law, the trial courts rely on the findings of investigative judges and the written report as being dispositive on factual matters; hence the additional overlay of an IST trial process flavored with the adversarial model could logically lead to longer trials which may or may not serve the true interests of justice from the societal and personal perspectives.

resume when the accused’s counsel is present.
(B) The questioning, including any waiver of the right to counsel, shall be audio-recorded or video-recorded in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 43. The Prosecutor shall at the beginning of the questioning caution the accused in accordance with Rule 42 (A)(iii).

149 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 49(A).
151 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 42.
152 Id. at para. 170. See also Id. at para. 213(A) (“The court’s its [sic] verdict in a case is based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing. Evidence includes reports, witness statements, written records of an interrogation, other official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians and other legally established evidence.”).
153 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 62 (describing exculpatory evidence as “evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of a prosecution witness or the authenticity of prosecution evidence.”).
154 Zappala, supra note 150, at 861. For example, unlike the ICTY and ICTR rules, the IST Rules of Procedure explicitly build in a right of cross-examination for the party who did not call a witness, even as they permit the judges to “put any question to the witness.” Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 77.
On the other hand, in preparing for a full trial of the issues, the defense team benefits from the underlying provisions of Iraqi criminal procedure law in two major ways. First, the defense team may leverage the power of the investigative process to generate information or perspective relevant to the conduct of the defense. The Iraqi criminal procedure code permits the investigator to appoint, at government expense, one or more experts on matters “connected to the offense being investigated.” 155 The investigative judge may retain an expert “of his own accord or based on the request of the parties.” 156

Secondly, in the preliminary investigation stage of any criminal proceeding under the Iraqi civil law system, the investigating judge has full subpoena power to compel the production of relevant evidence. The investigative judge may “issue an order for the arrest of any witness who fails to attend in due time for him to be compelled to attend in order to give evidence.” 157 Similarly, the investigating judge has authority to order physical searches of places or persons. 158 The IST Rules embody this practice in that “either party” may request that the investigative judge “make such orders, summonses, subpoenas and warrants as may be necessary in the interests of justice.” 159

3. Prevention of Coercion

Perhaps the most misunderstood and most vital aspect of the IST structure is the mechanism to prevent the use of any evidence adduced by torture or other improper techniques. Just as in other war crimes trials, cases before the IST may rely in part on evidence obtained prior to the time the defendant or other persons enjoyed a binding right to counsel. 160 Nevertheless, the Trial Chambers of the IST hold the penultimate power to protect the basic human rights of the accused. Though empowered to admit relevant evidence based on its probative value alone, the Trial Chamber should consider “[t]he voluntariness of any statement and any circumstances that might verify or

155 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 69(A).
156 Id.
157 Id. at para. 59(C).
158 Id. at para. 74 (“If it appears to the examining magistrate that particular person is holding items or papers which would inform the investigation, he may issue a written order for the items to be submitted. If he believes that the order will not be obeyed or is worried that the items will be removed, he may conduct a search procedure in accordance with the paragraphs below.”).
159 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 53(A) (this authority also extends to the right of the Trial Judge or Trial Chamber to make such orders as “may be necessary for the purposes of the preparation or conduct of the trial.”).
160 For example, in preparation for the Dachau trials, interrogation teams were sent to prisoner of war camps across the United States. One of the critical pieces of evidence against the camp commander of the Dachau camp came from a former German guard who had been captured in southern France in 1944 and was held at Camp Butler, North Carolina. JOSHUA M. GREENE, JUSTICE AT DACHAU: THE TRIALS OF AN AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 31 (2003).
impugn the statement.” In particular, the IST Rules come closer to a full blown exclusionary rule than almost any foreign jurisdiction by requiring the Trial Chamber to consider whether “the means by which evidence was obtained casts substantial doubt on its reliability.”

Apart from the specific admonition noted above to the suspect or accused that any statement may be recorded and used as evidence (which is acknowledged and signed by both the accused and the investigative judge), the IST requirements exceed even United States domestic law by requiring:

Whenever an Investigative Judge questions an accused, the questioning shall be recorded by audio, video, court reporter or by other means. The accused shall be informed that the questioning is being recorded. At the conclusion of the questioning the accused shall be offered the opportunity to clarify anything he has said, and to add anything he may wish, and the time of conclusion shall be recorded. The content of the recording shall then be transcribed (if done by audio or video) as soon as practicable after the conclusion of questioning and a copy of the transcript supplied to the suspect.

In practice, these recordings and the subsequent transcriptions should more than suffice to persuade fair-minded observers that the IST Trial Processes and ultimate judgments do not derive from coercive techniques.

These IST procedures are also built on a deeper tradition of respect that is ingrained in Iraqi criminal procedure (though it is fair to assume that the perception of the world is colored by the willful abuses of these basic human rights under the Ba’athist regime). For example, at the investigative stage, a witness “may not be addressed in a declaratory or insinuating manner and no sign or gesture may be directed at him that would tend to intimidate, confuse or distress him.” Any public official or agent who uses torture to extract evidence from “an accused, witness, or informant” also commits a crime under the Iraqi criminal code. As a logical extension of this criminal

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162 Contra ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 95, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited on June 19, 2005) (“No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.”).
164 Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 100, Rule 47.
165 Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 96, para. 64.
166 Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, para. 333, reprinted in UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (2004) (copy on file with author) (“Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the torture of an accused, witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the commission of an offence or to make a statement or provide information about such offence or to withhold information or to give a particular opinion in respect of it is punishable by imprisonment or by detention. Torture shall include the use of force or menaces.”).
prohibition, Iraqi procedural law prohibits the “use of any illegal method to influence the accused and extract a confession.”\textsuperscript{166} Finally, the IST incorporates the underlying norm of Iraqi criminal procedure in that the court can accept a confession only if it has been corroborated and when “it is satisfied with it.”\textsuperscript{167} Similarly, Iraqi law requires that “it is a condition of the acceptance of the confession that it is not given as a result of coercion.”\textsuperscript{168} Those who ignore these established jurisprudential roots to believe that the IST process will ignore and undermine core human rights protections betray an unseemly smugness that is unwarranted by the actual provisions of law and the IST guarantees as they will be implemented in practice.

\textbf{V. Conclusion}

Most of the Iraqi people have supported the prosecution of Saddam and other Ba’athist officials inside Iraq rather than simply allowing an external tribunal to exercise punitive power.\textsuperscript{169} They suffered the injustices and indignities of the Ba’athist regime and have the strongest stake in the restoration of authentic justice. For the ancient Greeks, the pursuit of justice symbolized a quest for order and harmony.\textsuperscript{170} Plato conceived of justice as “the highest order of things” on both the personal and societal level.\textsuperscript{171} The aspiration for justice embodies the proper balance of power, wisdom, and temperance which in turn generate societal stability. In any case, it seems clear that the choice of punishments should be reserved for sovereign governments answerable to a society in which they live and work rather than the mandarins who minister to the machinery of international politics.\textsuperscript{172} The Iraqis deserve the frontline role in serving the needs of their own nation, and their families and their culture. They are best placed to make the difficult decisions over how many of the millions of possible charges should be

\textsuperscript{166} Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, \textit{supra} note 96, para. 127 (Mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxicants are considered illegal methods).

\textsuperscript{167} Id. at para. 213(C) (CPA Memorandum 3 deleted the additional language “and if there is no other evidence which proves it to be a lie”).

\textsuperscript{168} Id. at para. 218 (CPA Memorandum 3 modified this provision by deleting the additional caveats that coercion could include both physical or moral components or even promises or threats).


\textsuperscript{170} BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM SOCRATES TO THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 31 (1982).

\textsuperscript{171} FRANCIS M. CORNFORD (trans.), \textit{THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO} 52-53 (1945).

\textsuperscript{172} For a detailed account of the Cold War politics and unraveling of wartime unity that doomed the effort to convene a second International Military Tribunal after World War II to prosecute Major War Criminals, see DONALD BLOXHAM, \textit{GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY} 28-37 (2001).
investigated and where the proper balance between justice and vengeance should be struck. The lawyers and investigators who have risked their lives and endangered their families by agreeing to serve their nation on the IST are patriots worthy of our respect and our assistance.

The formation of the IST as a domestic mechanism created under the authority of a sovereign Iraqi government culminates the developmental arc of recent efforts to implement accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. The IST is closer to the conflict in temporal terms as well as the available evidence and the victims of the crimes. The Iraqi people will determine the legitimacy and ultimate effectiveness of the trials, and they will reap the benefits derived from restoring the rule of law, just as at the time of this writing they are currently paying a disproportionate share of the costs for the insurgents who continue to murder civilians. The IST also represents a return to the first principles of international criminal law because it is grounded in the fertile soil of state sovereignty. In light of the inspiring growth of the field of international criminal law since World War II, it is often forgotten that the Moscow Declaration specifically favored punishment through the national courts in the countries where the crimes were committed “according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein.”

173 Allied prosecutors had to sift through the trial dossiers of more than 100,000 potential criminals in deciding who should be prosecuted and in what order. See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 273 (1992). As another of the hundreds of examples, the victorious allies excluded the Krupps from the dock at Nuremberg for political and policy reasons rather than a sober assessment of how best to serve the needs of German society. Bloxham, supra note 172, at 22.

174 Some scholars have made a distinction between the acknowledgement of severe violations of international norms—whether to remember or forget the abuses—and accountability for those crimes—or whether to impose sanctions on those who bear personal responsibility for the abuses. Simon Chesterman and You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building 157 (2004).

175 Who, it should be remembered, also enjoyed basic human rights that were trampled by the regime.

176 IX Department of State Bulletin, No. 228, 310, reprinted in Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Tribunals 11 (1945) The Moscow Declaration was actually issued to the Press on November 1, 1943. For an account of the political and legal maneuvering behind the effort to bring this stated war aim into actuality, see Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story 86-110 (2001). The Declaration specifically stated that German criminals were to be “sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein.” The text of the Moscow Declaration is available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm (last visited on June 19, 2005). The international forum was limited only to those offenses where a single country had no greater grounds for claiming jurisdiction than another country. Justice Jackson recognized this reality in his famous opening statement. He accepted the fact that the International Military Tribunal was merely a necessary alternative to domestic courts for prosecuting the “symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism.” Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, II Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 99 (1947). He further clarified that any defendants who succeeded in “escaping the condemnation of this Tribunal ... will be delivered up to our continental Allies.” Id. at 100.
commissions established in the Far East similarly incorporated the principle that the international forum did not supplant domestic mechanisms.\textsuperscript{177} Even the Secretary-General of the United Nations Security Council is persuaded that “no rule of law reform, justice reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or sustainable.”\textsuperscript{178}

Truth-based trials that conform to the principles of fundamental fairness will be a tangible demonstration that Iraqi society is on the road to a future built on the values of justice and personal liberty. The IST may not be a perfect creation, and it will certainly suffer growing pains as it grapples with the incredibly complex and emotionally charged cases that lie down the road to justice. “Justice” is an intellectual abstraction achieved only through emotional investment and intellectual struggle. The drafters of the IST and those patriots who will implement its provisions are all too aware that willful failure to protect basic human rights could corrode the very core of the society that they have risked their lives to build. If those who claim to support the principles of justice and of the rule of law refuse to help in the name of human rights, they can only do so by turning a blind eye to the rich jurisprudential roots of the IST. As the Iraqis build a rule of law for themselves, those who advocate the rule of law should extend their solidarity rather than seeking to elbow the Iraqis aside and substitute an artificial view of what they deem best for Iraq.

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\textsuperscript{177} See Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals, General Headquarters, United States Army Pacific, AG 000.5, Sept. 24, 1945, para 5(b) (“Persons whose offenses have a particular geographical location outside Japan may be returned to the scene of their crimes for trial by competent military or civil tribunals of the local jurisdiction.”) (copy on file with author).
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This situation is in stark contrast to that, for example, of Moroccan women after the adoption of the new Family Code.\footnote{Morocco, Family Code (Moudawana), dahir N° 1-04-22 of 12 hija 1424 (Feb. 3, 2004) promulgating law N° 70-03 Bulletin Officiel n° 5358 du 2 ramadan 1426, 667, available at https://hrea.org/moudawana.html (last visited on Feb. 20, 2009).} According to its provisions, the guardianship is not an obligation imposed on women, but a right granted to them (Article 24) which they can exercise or not according to their choice (Article 25). There is also no provision in the Family Code which would authorize the guardian to request the annulment of the marriage just because he does not agree with the choice of his ward. In other countries, where the institution of guardianship for women is maintained, legislators introduce various safeguards against possible abuses. For example, in Malaysia, the Islamic Family Law, Article 7, maintains the requirement of the guardian’s consent in order for the marriage to be valid. However, it allows for the possibility to replace the guardian’s consent by authorization of a judge “where the wali [guardian] refuses his consent without sufficient reason.”\footnote{Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act (1984), art. 13 (b).} Moreover, the Act punishes, including by imprisonment, not only any attempt to prevent or to compel a person to marry (Article 37), but also the making of false declarations in order to compel or prevent a person to marry (Article 38). In addition, the fact that a woman was compelled by one or another means to a marriage is listed in Article 52 (1) as a valid ground for requesting a dissolution of the marriage.

The situation in Saudi Arabia is in a sharp contrast to these attempts. Not only are the powers of the guardian unrestricted, but the abuse is even facilitated by the maintenance of a very archaic rule governing the issue of women’s identification in legal proceedings, described in the Shadow Report.\footnote{Shadow Report, supra note 43, at 66-67.} Theoretically, the officer performing the marriage will ask woman’s consent, but since the woman is supposed to be covered from head to toe and neither this officer nor any judge will look at the woman, she has to be identified by two close male relatives. So they can present any woman and attribute her the identity they need. The woman whose identity and thus consent was misused in this way has no possibility to contest acts undertaken in her name because in order to go to a court or a judge she not only again needs the consent of the two male relatives, but is also identified in the same way. Thus, the abuse of power by guardians is not only unrestricted, but even facilitated by the Saudi Arabian legal system. Moreover, it is obvious that such rules regarding identification and access to courts will constitute impediments to the exercise by women of a panoply of rights, even those expressly granted and recognized by Saudi Arabian law.
D. Rights and Obligations of Spouses during Marriage

The conservative view of rights and obligations of spouses can be summarized as the husband having an obligation to provide for material needs of the family in return for which the wife has to be obedient to her husband in all areas of life. According to this version of the 'Islamic' view of family life, the husband is attributed the status of the head of the household because of his apparently better earning ability and obligation to provide for his wife and children.53 This material obligation imposed on the husband allows him to require from his wife to forgo her entire independence and autonomy.

In a system like that of Saudi Arabia, a woman needs the approval or authorisation of a close male relative (which for a married woman most often will be her spouse) for a variety of acts: work, going outside, traveling, conducting proceedings before a court, searching admission to educational institutions, entering hospitals for surgery including child birth, or registering the birth of a child. The situation of a married woman is far more restricted due to the duty of obedience to her husband that is imposed on her. This duty is understood very broadly and includes a variety of daily matters, including sexually satisfying her husband.54 Women are continually reminded by religious scholars of the necessity to be patient and to make every effort to keep their husbands satisfied in order to preserve the unity and stability of the family and the well-being of children.55 This insistence on and care for the stability of the family and the well-being of children is in so far astonishing as only women are required to strive for this. The legal system, as it operates in Saudi Arabia, does not show any degree of respect for the family and well-being of children, as shown in the case above where a woman’s male family members may annul the woman’s marriage of several years. Neither do you find this care in consideration of matters of custody and guardianship of children, as will be established below. Similarly, the system for dissolving a marriage maintained in Saudi Arabia demonstrates complete disregard for all these values (care for children and

53 SULEIMAN BIN ABDUL RAHMAN AL-HAGEEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 198 (2001) (“The woman has less earning power than the man due to the fact that once she marries, the burdens associated with pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood make it more difficult for her to earn as much as men can, generally speaking”).
54 For a discussion of some issues addressed by Saudi jurists in this relation, see KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME, supra note 39, at 196-197 (2001). For general references to juristic opinions about obedience even to wrong and unjust husbands, see id. at 210.
55 It is striking that according to the logic of opinions of many official Saudi jurists it is more important to be obedient to husbands than to God, the pleasure of God being made contingent upon the pleasure of husbands, even unjust and violent. This assertion contradicts the very nature of Islam which is defined as a religion of submission to God alone. Khaled Abou El Fadl discusses extensively the inner contradictions of such statements and demonstrates their inconsistency even from the point of view of classical Islamic law analysis. Id. at 218-222 and chapter 7 more generally.
stability of the family) except when it is a woman who wishes to initiate a divorce procedure.

Such regulation of women’s status makes a woman completely dependant from her male relative, and particularly from her husband upon her marriage, depriving her from the possibility to exercise effectively her rights in other areas where, theoretically, her rights are not restricted. Thus, for example, Islamic law does not restrict a woman’s right to dispose of her property or to initiate a lawsuit, but if she needs two male relatives to identify her for purposes of any act, she will never be able to perform them independently. It should be emphasized that married women are affected more severely than unmarried women. This fact is openly acknowledged, for example, in the reservation to the CEDAW made by Niger. In relation to women’s rights to choose their place of residence and domicile, the government states that it can only respect this right with regard to unmarried women:

The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that it can be bound by the provisions of this paragraph, particularly those concerning the right of women to choose their residence and domicile, only to the extent that these provisions refer only to unmarried women.56

In other Muslim countries women are rarely restricted in their rights to the degree prevailing in Saudi Arabia. Morocco and Tunisia went so far as to define rights and responsibilities of spouses as reciprocal and mutual and do not feel necessity to legalize wife’s duty to obedience, despite the fact that legislation of both countries is claimed to be derived from Islamic sources.57 Morocco even abolished any reference to the

56 Supra note 7.
57 See paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Preamble to the Moroccan Family Code, supra note 50, for reference to Islam as a source of legislation and importance of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning for finding new solutions to arising issues); See also paragraph 1 of the Law promulgating Personal Status Code of Tunisia: Decree of 13 August 1956 also, available at http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/csp/Menu.html (last visited on Apr. 3, 2009) (for reference to Islam). With respect to Morocco, the new Family Code defines rights and obligations of spouses as reciprocal (Compare art. 51 of the Family Code with art. 36, para. 2 of the previously applicable Moroccan Law of Personal Status). Art. 23 of the Tunisian Personal Status Code defines rights and obligations of spouses as mutual and reciprocal, except for the obligation of the husband to support the family. It is also interesting to note that other Muslim communities are receptive and open to such new interpretations. One example is the Counter Legal Draft to the Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law. This draft was prepared by a group of Islamic legal scholars led by a Special Assistant to the Minister of Religion. In this draft rights and obligations of spouses are defined as equal and no reference is made to the husband as head of the household. Unfortunately, due to critical reactions of some scholars, it did not pass into a law. But the very fact that an egalitarian vision of rights and obligations of spouses is possible in an Islamic context is well confirmed by this draft. For more detail on this document and its history, see Siti Musdah Mulia & Mark E. Cammack, Toward a Just Marriage Law: Empowering Indonesian Women Through a Counter Legal Draft to the Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law, ISLAMIC LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA 128 (R. MICHAEL FEENER & MARK E. CAMMACK eds., 2007).
husband as head of the household.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{E. Dissolution of Marriage}

According to all schools of Islamic law, divorce is an original right of the husband. He can divorce his wife by simply pronouncing a specified formula three times. The rationale behind placing the decision in hands of husbands is based firstly, on the previously established obligation of the husband to support his wife and, secondly, on an assumption about the nature of men and women:

The power to initiate divorce was given to the man in Islam because the man is more likely to be concerned to keep the wife whom he has spent his money on . . . because the man is more capable of balanced thinking and the sound assessment of the outcomes resulting from divorce.\textsuperscript{59}

Even if these assumptions are not questioned as such, but rather compared to other assumptions about the nature of men, especially those which are used as justifications for allowing polygamy and imposing on women the requirement of a veil, it is possible to undermine this justification. Thus the same author, when describing the reasons behind allowance of polygamy, states the following:

One of the justifications for polygamy is that there are some men with especially powerful sex drives but whose wives have less sexual desire or whose menstrual period lasts a long time each month. In such a case, the man has only two choices if he wants to release his excessive sexual energy: to take another wife, or to engage in extramarital intercourse, which is forbidden in Islam.\textsuperscript{60}

Similarly, when justifying the rule on women’s veiling he states:

If a woman is obliged to pass through the men’s sphere of activity once a day, for example, she can veil her face and go about her business without being in danger of causing temptation. However, if women’s faces and the other aspects of their physical beauty remain uncovered, and if men are still commanded to lower their gazes and remain chaste, this becomes unbearable for men . . .\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} See art. 1 of the previously applicable Moroccan Law of Personal Status (the husband was expressly declared as head of household. There is no comparable reference in the new Family Code).

\textsuperscript{59} RAHM AL-HAGIEEL, supra note 53, at 202, 204.

\textsuperscript{60} See RAHM AL-HAGIEEL, supra note 53, at 206. This explanation is very widespread among Muslims defending permission of polygamy. See also YUSUF AL-QARADAWI, supra note 41, at 192-193.

\textsuperscript{61} See RAHM AL-HAGIEEL, supra note 53, at 210.
How can a man, who is simply unable to control his sexual desires if he sees a beautiful woman’s face, be able to make a reasonable judgement about dissolution of his marriage if, for example, this beautiful woman agrees to marry him only if he divorces his previous wife? What kind of balanced thinking in matters of divorce can we expect from a man whose life is driven by his sexual desires?

All traditional interpretations of Islamic law also recognize other forms of divorce which can be useful to women if only their effective functioning would be guaranteed. Thus, both husband and wife have the right to request divorce on the ground that they would suffer harm if remaining married. Women in addition have the option to request divorce for material consideration. According to the traditional doctrine of Islamic law, this last form of divorce gives the possibility to women to request a divorce without having to prove any harm suffered if remaining married. Despite these options theoretically open to women to initiate divorce, their position is impaired by inadequate application and enforcement possibilities. Women have difficulties in bringing evidence to court, for example, evidence of physical abuse by their husbands. When attempting divorce for material consideration, women have to face abusive demands of their husbands which can also include merchandising custody of children. Moreover, according to the Shadow Report, judges in Saudi Arabia do not grant divorce for consideration without a woman having demonstrated that she suffers harm if remaining married despite the fact that the very raison d’être of this form of divorce is to allow women to divorce based on their will without requiring proof of any harm.62

Many Muslim countries despite their reluctance to abandon this traditional vision of the system of dissolution of marriage, being well aware of difficulties and burdens placed on women and the possibility of abuse by men, introduce various measures intended to palliate shortcomings of the system. Thus, many countries while maintaining the unconditional right of the husband to divorce recognize this form of divorce only if effected before a judge, so that the divorced woman can at least be informed about her husband’s decision.63 This also allows a judge to regulate other consequences of divorce, such as maintenance or guardianship and custody of children, taking into account information obtained during various procedures in front of the court. The grounds on which women can request divorce, i.e., for harm suffered, are defined as broadly as possible to include even cases when women are simply unhappy

63 See art. 83 of Mauritanian Personal Status Code promulgated by Law No 2001-052, French text available at http://www.carim.org/legaltexts/LE2MAU001_FR.pdf (last visited on July. 19, 2001) (obliges the husband to pronounce the divorce either before a judge or a conciliator and to attempt a reconciliation, which obviously gives this judge or conciliator the opportunity to get an insight into reasons for divorce and treat more appropriately any claims of the divorced women, in particular with regard to maintenance).
in the marriage.\textsuperscript{64} The divorce for consideration is subject to the judge’s control in order to avoid abusive demands by husbands, such as foregoing of custody rights by the woman. Thus, in Mauritania, the Personal Status Code expressly requires that the object of compensation shall be legal and if there are some irregularities, the divorce remains valid, but the husband receives nothing (Article 92).\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, if upon such a divorce for compensation a woman can establish that she used this procedure in order to escape mistreatment or prejudice caused to her by her former husband, not only does the divorce remain valid, but the husband is obliged to return what he received (Article 93). Even more far-reaching is the protection accorded to women in Malaysia. The negotiation of the amount of compensation always occurs before a judge who, in case of disagreement about the amount, can determine this amount himself taking into account the status and financial means of the parties.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{F. Custody and Guardianship of Children upon Dissolution of Marriage}

According to the traditional doctrine of the four schools of Islamic law, upon dissolution of a marriage the custody (physical care) of the child is attributed to the mother until the child reaches a certain age. The guardianship (legal representation) always remains with the father, or if he is judged unfit for this role, it is attributed to another male relative of the father’s family, but not to the mother. The father or another male relative also acquires the custody of the child after the age limit is reached or if the mother remarries. Interestingly, there is no unanimity and a significant difference among schools with regard to the age-limit after which the mother loses her custody. According to some of the most conservative opinions, a boy will be transferred to the father after the termination of the period of breast-feeding which is fixed at two years; other versions include the age of marriage for girls and age of 15 for boys. The justification for non-attribution of guardianship and only limited custody rights to the mother usually involves some assumptions about the nature of women which arguably prevents them from caring appropriately for the child, especially as far as the earning potential is concerned.

\textsuperscript{64} See the Egyptian legislation which, although based on the Hanafi interpretation traditionally recognizing very limited number of grounds as harming, incorporates many other grounds traditionally defined by other schools of Islamic law. Consider also the inclusion among grounds for divorce of a general clause of “any other ground which is recognized as valid for [the] dissolution of marriages” in art. 52 (1) (l) of Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act (1984) in Malaysia.


\textsuperscript{66} See art. 49 (3) of the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act (1984).
According to the approach commonly adopted by judges in Saudi Arabia with regard to this issue, custody is given to the mother till the boy turns nine, or till the girl turns seven, unless the mother remarries, in which case she loses her custody. After that date, the custody is automatically transferred to the father.67 As stated in the Shadow Report:

The principle of “who is more fitting” for custody is not a factor in changing this equation. Thus the father is accorded the right over the mother even if he is drunkard or violent. The mother's capacity to custody could be jeopardized by the fact that she does not cover her face or listen to music or has a satellite TV. The matter is subject to the discretion of the judge . . . 68

The report emphasizes that even the father’s unemployment and the fact that it is the mother who actually earns and supports herself and the child is not considered by judges as a reason for granting custody to women.69 This stance is in complete contradiction with the reasons invoked for not granting custody to women (namely, ability to provide financial support to the child) and demonstrates that this discriminatory rule is yet another example of the absurdity of patriarchy.

This system of depriving women from effective relationships with their children upon dissolution of marriage appears even more shocking if one considers legislative solutions adopted in various Muslim countries in order to mitigate negative consequences for women and children and ultimately, establishing best interests of the child as a guiding principle. Let us consider, for example, the solution chosen by the Moroccan legislature. According to Article 171 of the Family Code, the mother has priority in acquiring physical custody of the child upon dissolution of marriage without any regard to the age of the child. This custody can be assumed by the mother until the child reaches majority, whether a boy or a girl, unless the child chooses the father at the age of 15.70 The law also sets limits to the automatic termination of the mother’s custody upon her remarriage. The child remains in the mother’s custody (even if she remarries) if the child is under the age of seven, if the separation from the mother will be prejudicial to the child, if the child’s state of health requires the mother’s care, if the person to whom the mother is married is a close relative of the child or his guardian, and finally and most importantly, if the mother is the guardian of the child. According to Moroccan Family Code, although the father is the natural guardian of the child

68 Id. at 14.
69 Id. at 72.
70 Id. at art. 166 (formulating the right of a child who has attained the age of fifteen to choose either the mother or the father as his custodian).
(Article 236), the mother can obtain guardianship (legal representation of the child) in case of father’s death, absence, incapacity or as the law adds “for any other motif.” Such regulation of the issue of custody and guardianship of children upon dissolution of marriage, although leaving in place certain discriminatory presumptions, significantly diminishes the negative consequences for women and children, but also limits possible interference into the mother-child relationship by other family members.

Before closing discussion on this issue, I would like to make the following additional remark. It is too simplistic to assume that the introduction of the best interests of the child principle will in itself suffice to improve the situation in Saudi Arabia and other countries which have such an anti-progressive approach to women’s rights in Islam. This principle can be very helpful in other countries, where prejudices against women are less strong and there exists a certain tradition of women’s involvement in society, as for example in Bangladesh and Pakistan. In these countries, despite persistent difficulties faced by women in certain areas, courts are able to overrule some interpretations of Islamic law giving custody of children to the mother on the basis of the best interests of the child. In Saudi Arabia, it may be possible to avoid the most flagrant abuses of children using the principle of the best interests of the child, but it does not necessarily mean that women will have more opportunities to acquire custody of their children. The argument will go in the direction of invoking some innate characteristics of women, preventing them from taking care of certain aspects of child’s education, and the custody will rather be attributed to the child’s close relatives from the father’s family, but not necessarily to the mother.

**G. Concluding on ‘Islamic View’**

The analysis made above has clearly demonstrated that despite all impediments to the correct functioning of Islamic law in the framework of modern nation-states, the diversity of views and interpretative possibilities persists. This diversity is visible not only at the informal level of scholarly discussions, which was intentionally left out of consideration for the purposes of this contribution, but also at the official legislative state level. There are many factors influencing the possibilities of and ways taken by

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71 See art. 238 (2) of Moroccan Family Code, supra note 50. It is also important to mention that although the father can choose a guardian to be appointed after his death, the father’s choice of guardian is first subject to judiciary control, and the rights of the guardian are limited to supervising the mother’s acts and decisions in relation to her child. The guardian thus appointed cannot take any decision regarding the child in place of the mother. In case of doubts or contestations, the intended guardian has to initiate procedure before judge or tribunal.

72 The most well-know decisions include Md. Abu Baker Siddique et al., 38 Dhaka Law Reports (AD) 1986; Mst. Zohra Begum et al., *Pakistan Legal Decision* 695 (1965).
these interpretative processes. A majority of these factors has nothing to do with religion, but are rather linked to the nature of the political regime in place. A combination of totalitarianism and patriarchy makes any advancement for women, even an advancement motivated by religious factors simply impossible.

It is also important to emphasize the fundamental possibility and necessity of a diversity of viewpoints within the Islamic legal tradition. Even the few examples of more women-friendly interpretations of Islamic law given above demonstrate the reality of a variety of ways in which the improvement can be achieved. There is no universal solution, no unique ‘Islamic’ women-friendly interpretation. Each society, each country has to go its own way, taking inspiration from the experience of other nations, but also from its own unique conditions and circumstances.

IV. What to Choose?

Given these divergent possibilities, all of which are justified in terms of Islamic law, is there one opinion which can be regarded as more authentic than another? How shall international lawyers, who in one way or another have to deal with issues arising around application of Islamic law, approach this diversity of views?

First and foremost, given the precepts and underlying principles of Islam as well as the historical development of Islamic legal culture, it is very troubling that the ruling elite appropriates the right to define religious obligations for ordinary individuals leaving them no room to exercise personal choice.

Islamic legal tradition is very rich in accounts about independence of jurists, authorised to derive concrete legal rules from original sources (e.g., from the Quran and Sunna). Many contemporary scholars have demonstrated that the tradition of dissociation of jurists from political power which was associated with vice was central to the correct functioning of the traditional Islamic legal system. The ultimate source of jurists’ authority came from their morality and independence from corrupted power.\textsuperscript{73} What we observe in many Muslim states today is the opposite of this picture of an independent and morally responsible jurist’s figure. By definition, the legislature in modern states is a part of state apparatus and, thus, of the ruling elite. A majority of Muslim jurists are dependent on a state’s support and funding.

Furthermore, one of the features of classical Islamic legal discourse is the respect of

\textsuperscript{73} See Wael B. Hallaq, supra note 38, at 178-226 and Wael B. Hallaq, “Muslim Rage” and Islamic Law, 54 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1705 (2002-2003), at 1708-1709.
opinions of other scholars including those coming from other schools of Islamic law. From this point of view the situation in Saudi Arabia where only one interpretation is chosen as appropriately Islamic and enforced by authorities on every citizen represents a complete denial of Islamic values.

From a more general point of view, once the legislation becomes a matter of politics and choices are made by the state, as it is the case in all parts of Muslim world since the creation of modern nation-states, this legislation, be it secular or inspired by Islamic values shall necessarily become subject to contestation, negotiation and also critique by all members of a given society. The very fact of the state’s influence and involvement in rule-formation and formulation deprives them of any claim of authenticity and infallibility. In contrast, the very fact that rules are negotiated by all members of a Muslim community, in order to reach the best possible solution in accordance with indicators provided by God, allows these rules to make a claim of religious origin or inspiration. In order to keep this characteristic (i.e., rules being derived from religious teaching and retaining some kind of Islamic character) they should always remain subject to contestation and re-negotiation by members of any given Muslim community. Once it is claimed that established rules are the best and the only Islamic way of regulating a particular area, they immediately lose even this minimalist religious character.

What conclusions should international lawyers who regard themselves as outsiders to this negotiative process draw from the above suggestions? First, they should abandon tendency towards the sacralization of laws which claim to be Islamic. This tendency is still often visible in international law and is mainly expressed as the essentialization of one or another interpretation of Islamic law adopted into official legislation as the only and ultimate Islamic law. The interpretation in question will usually be one of the most detrimental to women. Moreover, in doing so international lawyers implicitly deny to Muslim women (rarely to men) the right to freedom of religion, the right to think differently and adopt another version of Islamic law. In contrast, what international lawyers should not forget, is the difficulty faced by many Muslim states and communities in dealing with such highly valued cultural-religious issues. Muslims expressing views on Islam that are divergent from official interpretations adopted as laws in their countries of origin shall have an opportunity to be heard at least at the international level.

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74 A very good example of such an attitude is the treatment of asylum claims made by Muslim women. See generally Susan Mussarat Akram, Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 7 (2000).