JEAIL > Volume 18(2); 2025 > Article
Research Paper
Published online: November 30, 2025
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2025.18.2.03
Defining the Boundaries: WTO National Security Exceptions in the US-China Unilateral Trade Sanctions
Youyou Jiang
Nanjing Tech University
30 South Puzhu Road, Nanjing 211816, Jiangsu Province, China.
Corresponding Author: jyy@njtech.edu.cn
ⓒ Copyright YIJUN Institute of International Law
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/liceInha University Law School, 100 Inharo, Michuhol-gu, Incheon 22212 Korea. / nses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
Chinese enterprises, such as Huawei, have been severely affected by sanctions. In 2019, Huawei’s inclusion on the Entity List prohibited any foreign company using US technology from supplying it without approval, severely disrupting its global supply chain. This article interprets the national security exceptions (GATT Article XXI) in the US-China trade conflict. Through a doctrinal analysis of key rulings (e.g., Russia – Traffic in Transit), it constructs a three-factor review framework based on essential security interests, necessity, and emergencies in international relations. This framework is then applied to a comparative case study of US and Chinese sanctions practices. The analysis finds that while US extraterritorial sanctions frequently fail the necessity test, China’s counter-sanctions align more closely with the exception’s traditional scope. The article argues that the proportionality principle is vital to prevent abuse. By applying nascent DSB jurisprudence to a major contemporary dispute, this study provides a balanced framework for assessing the WTO-consistency of sanctions and suggests reinforcing the MPIA to reconcile sovereignty with multilateralism.
Keywords :
National Security Exceptions, Unilateral Sanctions, Counter Sanctions, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
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